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Abstract In recent years, British science policy has seen a signiﬁcant shift ‘from
deﬁcit to dialogue’ in conceptualizing the relationship between science and the
public. Academics in the interdisciplinary ﬁeld of Science and Technology Studies
(STS) have been inﬂuential as advocates of the new public engagement agenda.
However, this participatory agenda has deeper roots in the political ideology of the
Third Way. A framing of participation as a politics suited to post-Fordist conditions
was put forward in the magazine Marxism Today in the late 1980s, developed in the
Demos thinktank in the 1990s, and inﬂuenced policy of the New Labour govern-
ment. The encouragement of public participation and deliberation in relation to
science and technology has been part of a broader implementation of participatory
mechanisms under New Labour. This participatory program has been explicitly
oriented toward producing forms of social consciousness and activity seen as
essential to a viable knowledge economy and consumer society. STS arguments for
public engagement in science have gained inﬂuence insofar as they have intersected
with the Third Way politics of post-Fordism.
Keywords Participation  Engagement  Post-Fordism  Knowledge economy 
New Labour
Introduction
Over the last decade, there has been a signiﬁcant shift in the way in which the
relationship between science and the public is understood and handled in British
science policy. This well-documented shift is summed up in the slogan ‘‘from deﬁcit
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DOI 10.1007/s11024-010-9157-8to dialogue’’ (Irwin and Michael 2003, 47–55; Gregory and Lock 2008). The notion
of the ‘public understanding of science’ that gained currency in the wake of the
Royal Society’s 1985 Bodmer Report entailed a one-way transfer of information
from ofﬁcially recognised science to the public. In contrast, a more reciprocal
dialogic relationship was called for inﬂuentially in the 2000 ‘Science and Society’
report by the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology. This
dialogic approach was put into practice in the early summer of 2003, when the
government sponsored a series of public debates on genetically modiﬁed (GM)
crops and food under the title ‘GM Nation?’ (Horlick-Jones et al. 2007). In 2004, the
Ofﬁce of Science and Technology established the Sciencewise program to promote
dialogic public engagement with emerging or potentially controversial science and
technology ﬁelds such as stem cell research and nanotechnology (Thorpe and
Gregory 2010).
Britain has not been alone in exploring participatory initiatives. Sabine Maasen
and Peter Weingart write that ‘‘[t]he ‘democratization of expertise’ is the order of
the day in national governments and supra-national bodies such as the EU’’ (Maasen
and Weingart 2005, 2). Denmark led the way in developing consensus conferences
(Dryzek and Tucker 2008; Jensen 2005; Joss 1999; Levidow 1998, 218). Citizen
juries have been used in Germany and the USA (Joss 1999, 291; Dunkerley and
Glasner 1998, 182) and Germany has seen experiments with participatory
technology assessment in relation to agricultural biotechnology (Levidow 1998,
217). The democratization of expertise through public participation in science and
technology has also recently been promoted at the level of the European Union
(Abels 2002). While comparative study of these developments is important (see for
example Jasanoff 2005; Murphy and Levidow 2006), this paper seeks to understand
in national political context why these new forms emerged in science policy in the
UK. Whereas Danish social democracy has a longstanding tradition of active
inclusion of interest organizations (Dryzek and Tucker 2008, 866), the new
participatory forums that have been promoted in Britain over the last 10 years
contrast with past patterns of elitist and often exclusionary governance in the UK
(Dryzek et al. 2003). Despite, or even because of, this contrast with existing political
culture, the forms of public engagement instituted in Britain have been, Sheila
Jasanoff has said, ‘‘remarkably innovative’’ (Jasanoff 2005, 286). In the course of
the last decade, Britain has come to be seen as being ‘‘at the forefront’’ in its pursuit
of ‘upstream engagement’ in relation to emerging technologies such as nanotech-
nology (Joly and Kaufmann 2008, 226).
The shift toward ‘dialogue’ and ‘engagement’ took place against the background
of a series of policy crises and public controversies, including the BSE crisis of the
early to mid-1990s, the controversy over genetically modiﬁed foods a few years
later, the foot and mouth disease outbreak of 2001, and public disquiet over claimed
links between the MMR vaccine and autism. All these controversies seemed to
demonstrate a breakdown in public trust in ofﬁcial pronouncements about issues
involving science (Jasanoff 2005, 282). The idea that the relationship between
science and the public needed to be reformed also gained intellectual support from
sociologically-oriented academics in the interdisciplinary ﬁeld of Science and
Technology Studies (STS), who criticized technocratic approaches to risk and
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contestable. STS scholars argued that opening up the political and epistemic
assumptions of research and technological programs for scrutiny and debate would
produce a more democratic, reﬂexive, and ‘socially robust’ science and policy
(Irwin 1995; Wynne 1992, 1996; Nowotny et al. 2001). These arguments inﬂuenced
the pivotal 2000 report by the House of Lords Select Committee (Irwin and Michael
2003, 55).
1
How were these arguments for dialogic participation in science able to gain
traction in policy networks and government? Part of the explanation is elite anxiety
about the crisis of legitimacy of science in the wake of BSE and later controversies.
But these crises could conceivably have called forth quite different responses, for
example focusing on tightening regulation and reasserting technocratic control. The
appeal of arguments for participation also owed to the particular ideological
orientation of the New Labour government. This paper draws attention to this
political dimension of science policy, which has largely been neglected in STS. I
will show that the case for new modes of public participation was an element of
Third Way political thought that had inﬂuenced the development of New Labour.
2
The Third Way was a new style of centre-left politics closely associated with Tony
Blair’s leadership of the Labour Party and Prime Ministership, and inﬂuenced by the
writings of the sociologist Anthony Giddens and the London thinktank Demos. The
degree of receptivity of science policy under New Labour toward participatory ideas
from STS has to do with the way in which public participation was already
established as a value within the Third Way, especially as formulated by Demos.
In the Third Way conception of participation, expanding the scope for public
involvement was a response to the economic conditions of post-Fordism, the new
economic formation characterized by ﬂexible specialization in the organization of
production, new computer and communication technologies, and the shift in
advanced economies from the production of material goods to a growing emphasis
on knowledge work and services. Third Way thinkers suggested that expanded
participation was made possible by these new social and economic conditions and
was also necessary for fostering the kind of active and creative citizens, knowledge
workers, and consumers who would be the drivers of post-Fordist economic growth.
In the 1990s, the rubric of post-Fordism was increasingly replaced by ‘the
knowledge economy,’ but the core idea remained that of an economy oriented
toward services and knowledge production, and new modes of ﬂexibility both in the
workplace and in social relationships and lifestyles.
Demos was an important site for the theorization of post-Fordism and the
knowledge economy on the centre-left in the 1990s. The thinktank was founded in
1993 by Martin Jacques, the former editor of Marxism Today, and Geoff Mulgan, a
Marxism Today contributor. It also drew in other Marxism Today collaborators,
1 John Durant and Brian Wynne were the main specialist advisors to the committee, and other academics
in STS and science communication gave evidence, including Martin Bauer, Steve Fuller, Alan Irwin,
Steve Miller, and Jon Turney (Select Committee on Science and Technology, House of Lords, 2000,
Appendices 1 and 2).
2 New Labour as the context for participative approaches in science policy has been discussed in Gregory
and Lock (2008 esp. 1257–1258) and Thorpe and Gregory (2010 esp. 282–285).
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Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), but also functioned in the 1980s as the
primary intellectual organ of the British left and was very inﬂuential in moderate,
liberal-left and modernizing circles within the Labour Party. Jacques argues that it
was ‘‘easily the most inﬂuential political magazine in Britain between 1978 and
1991’’ (Jacques 2006). Its termination in 1991 was a result of the folding of the
CPGB in November of that year in response to the demise of the Soviet Union.
In the 1990s, Demos combined the post-Fordist argument for a modernized left
with a broader Third Way political agenda that inﬂuenced the development of New
Labour (Cockett 1997; Harris 2006). The notion that late modern society required a
new kind of active, participatory democratic politics was axiomatic in Demos
thinking in the 1990s. Much as had Marxism Today, Demos ascribed to post-
Fordism, or what was increasingly referred to as the ‘knowledge economy,’ all
kinds of liberating and popular democratic attributes. The idea of an inherent
connection between post-Fordism and democratization was at the core of Demos
thinking.
Demos intellectuals had a direct impact on policy in the early years of the Blair
government. Geoff Mulgan became director of the Government’s Strategy Unit and
head of policy in the Prime Minister’s ofﬁce. Charles Leadbeater has been
particularly important as a promoter of the idea of the knowledge economy, in
particular with his 1999 book, Living on Thin Air. In 1998 the DTI, then under Peter
Mandelson, commissioned Leadbeater to draft the White Paper Our Competitive
Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy (DTI 1998a). The British Third
Way project was very much inﬂuenced by an ideology of innovation that
glamorized technology and the knowledge economy and that presented these
economic developments as having liberating corollaries in the cultural and political
sphere. Giddens writes that ‘‘In the early 1990s it was still unusual to speak of the
emergence of the knowledge economy and many were sceptical… [But] Blair and
Brown were convinced early on, and much of Labour’s economic and social policy
follows from this conviction’’ (Giddens 2008, xii).
Giddens’ 1998 book, The Third Way, was important as an intellectual
systematization and defense of this political orientation and he advised Blair in
the early period of New Labour government (Boynton 1997; Mann 1999). Giddens
shared with Marxism Today and Demos the basic idea that a new politics ‘beyond
left and right’ (Giddens 1994) was a necessary response to social transformations
such as the rise of globalization and the knowledge economy. The overlap in
thinking between Giddens and Demos is suggested by Giddens’ acknowledgment
that The Third Way ‘‘grew out of a series of informal evening discussion meetings’’
between himself, Mulgan, and Ian Hargreaves (New Statesman editor and Chair of
the Demos Board of Trustees) (Giddens 1998, ix).
3
The combination of participation and the knowledge economy in Third Way
thinking was the ideological terrain that provided a congenial environment for the
entry of ideas from STS into science policy under New Labour. Demos has recently
been important in advocating ‘upstream’ public engagement in science policy,
3 For Hargreaves’ Demos writings, see for example Hargreaves and Christie eds. 1998.
392 C. Thorpe
123publishing a series of reports on this topic in collaboration with STS academics
(Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Wilsdon et al. 2005; Kearnes et al. 2006; Stilgoe et al.
2008). The thinktank has also carried out a series of public dialogues on
nanotechnology, with funding from Sciencewise, and has created forums for
discussion between STS researchers, politicians and civil servants, representatives
of business, and NGOs such as Greenpeace (Stilgoe 2007; Thorpe and Gregory
2010, 293–294). Demos is not a homogeneous group, and involves, for the most
part, different people today than in the 1990s. Yet, there are important thematic
continuities which characterize the thinktank’s general orientation and are reﬂected
in its approach to science policy: the conceptualization of innovation as a broad
social process; a view of the high skills knowledge and creative economy as the
source of global competitiveness and cultural vibrancy; an image of the knowledge
economy as being entwined with personal freedom and political democratization; an
emphasis on networks as key features of the knowledge economy; and a critique of
bureaucracy in favor of partnerships across the public and private sectors.
Analyses of post-Fordism and the knowledge economy by thinkers associated
with Marxism Today and Demos set the stage both for New Labour interest in
participatory forms of governance and for the entry into the policy ﬁeld of STS
arguments for public participation in science and technology. The links drawn by
Demos thinkers between participation and post-Fordism or the knowledge economy
are signiﬁcant for understanding the mode in which participation has been adopted
within British policy. The notion of a high-value knowledge economy as a way to
compete on the global market has been central to the British government’s
economic strategy and particularly to the departments in which science policy has
been housed, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and its successors the
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) and the Department for
Business Innovation and Skills (BIS). The British government has conceptualized
public participation in science as one element within a broader policy agenda of
shaping Britain as a knowledge economy. Science policy White Papers and
government reports present participation as being supportive of innovation and
commercialized science. The formulation of participation as a form of post-Fordist
politics has resulted in its subsumption within the dominant agenda of ensuring
Britain’s competitiveness as a knowledge economy. This paper traces how the
emergence of public participation as a strand of British science policy was
inﬂuenced by arguments in Marxism Today and Demos for participation as a mode
of politics suited to social and economic conditions of post-Fordism.
Marxism Today: Thatcherism and New Times
The term ‘Thatcherism’ was coined within the pages of Marxism Today and a key
line of inquiry in the magazine concerned explicating Thatcherism as a political,
social and more broadly cultural phenomenon of right-wing hegemony. Jacques and
Stuart Hall argued that while Thatcherism was in many ways deeply authoritarian
and backward-looking, it also tapped into forms of consciousness that were
distinctively new. Thatcher’s program resonated with a new culture of individualism,
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viewed as anachronistic (Hall and Jacques 1983a; Hall 1983). Hall and Jacques
argued in Gramscian terms that it was up to the left to develop a counter-hegemonic
project. The left would not escape marginality or inexorable movement to the right
unless it could itself latch onto and articulate the new social forces that Thatcher had
succeeded in mobilizing (Hall and Jacques 1983a, 14–16). In order to be able to meld
a progressive political orientation with the new individualism, the left had to abandon
centralist and bureaucratic tendencies and instead embrace ‘‘the mobilization of
democratic power at the popular level’’ (Hall 1983, 33).
The coherent project of Marxism Today under the editorship of Jacques was to
analyze the social roots of rightwing hegemony and to construct a modernized left
politics. This project matured into the concept of ‘New Times,’ ﬁrst articulated in a
special issue in 1988. ‘New Times’ located the culture of individualism underpinning
Thatcherism in the economic and social transformations of post-Fordism, and sought
to analyse post-Fordism as a cultural and political phenomenon. Fordism was
underpinned by a group of social and political settlements that had unraveled
(Manifesto for New Times 1990, 25–27). New settlements were in the process of
being constructed for a post-Fordist society. The hope was that the analysis of New
Times would help to ‘‘prise Thatcherism and that world apart’’ and insert into the
political terrain a post-Fordist left capable of constructing a new hegemony (Hall and
Jacques 1990a, 15). New Times analysis therefore paid a lot of attention to the
liberating and progressive potential in post-Fordist developments: ﬂexibility,
breaking down of hierarchy, proliferation of subcultures, individual autonomy, and
irreverence for tradition. Rejecting nostalgia for old working-class mass movements,
Marxism Today exuded enthusiasm for late modernity, conveyed by its glossy and
stylish layout and sharp journalistic eye for the latest pop-cultural trends. A common
theme was choice and cultural diversity, afforded by new technologies such as
Satellite TV (Manifesto for New Times 1990, 23, 34), and the proliferation of
consumer brands and commodities of ‘‘Benetton Britain’’ (Murray 1990).
Leadbeater went beyond the other Marxism Today thinkers in arguing that the
left needed not only to adapt to the cultural dimensions of post-Fordism but also to
develop an economic strategy that articulated with these new forces. In a 1987
Fabian Society Tract titled The Politics of Prosperity, he urged the left to come to
terms with capitalist economic competition and to abandon its attachment to public
ownership and centralized planning. Facing up to post-Fordism meant that the left
had to accept the need for ‘‘ﬂexible working practices,’’ private ownership,
decentralised management, the market, and ‘‘proﬁtability as an important measure
of efﬁciency’’ (Leadbeater 1987, 11, 14). It was essential, Leadbeater declared in a
pamphlet a year later, to develop a ‘‘progressive economic modernisation in contrast
to the Thatcher Government’s reactionary economic modernisation’’ (Leadbeater
1988b, 4. Emphases in original). Leadbeater suggested that what had been taken to
be contradictory goals deﬁning left and right, for example equality versus efﬁciency,
were false choices. These goals were now entirely reconcilable because of the social
characteristics of post-Fordism. The economy was currently going through a
transition into a new epoch. The 1930s saw the shift from coal-based technologies
of the nineteenth century to oil and electricity based economies of the later twentieth
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information’’ technologies of the twenty-ﬁrst century (Leadbeater 1987, 21; see also
Leadbeater 1988b, 1). Leadbeater argued that these technological and economic
transformations carried with them the potential for progressive social change. Social
and economic modernisation would be mutually sustaining if Britain retooled itself
economically and culturally for post-Fordism, creating access to training for highly
skilled employment, fostering individual choice, and institutional openness.
In the 1988 Marxism Today special issue on ‘New Times,’ Leadbeater made the
case for what he called ‘‘Power to the Person’’ (Leadbeater 1988a). He argued that
the new individualism of the 1980s demanded, and made possible, a new kind of
active political involvement of individuals in society. Individualist aspirations for
‘‘autonomy, choice, decentralisation, [and] greater responsibility’’ could go beyond
the Thatcherite focus on market choice and be expressed by the left in political and
democratic terms (Leadbeater 1988a, 17). Leadbeater urged the left ‘‘to develop a
new agenda for… democratisation of the state, and the devolution of state power to
autonomous collective bodies, independent of the state.’’ Collective action could be
accomplished through a combination of the state, the market, and voluntary
organisations. Rather than state provision, public action could operate through the
oversight of private corporations by ‘‘[l]ocal regulatory bodies’’ addressing, for
example, environmental concerns (Leadbeater 1988a, 18–19). Leadbeater’s analysis
was important for articulating the contours of a new politics for New Times, in
which consumerist individualism would be extended and transformed into a
‘‘democratic individualism’’ (Leadbeater 1988a, 19).
There are many continuities between the New Times analysis and New Labour.
For one thing, there is the sheer emphasis on newness and an accompanying
valorization of the new over the old (Dillow 2007, 13; Finlayson 2003, 66). ‘‘‘New,
new, new’, Tony Blair told a meeting of European socialist leaders in a
characteristic outburst, shortly after entering ofﬁce, ‘everything is new’’’ (Marquand
1999, 226; see also Dillow 2007, 14). In his foreword to Our Competitive Future,h e
echoed this language: ‘‘The modern world is swept by change. New technologies
emerge constantly, new markets are opening up. There are new competitors but also
great new opportunities’’ (DTI 1998a, 5). An enthusiasm for the liberating
tendencies of consumerism and new technologies pervades both New Times and
New Labour discourse. As political theorist Alan Finlayson points out, both
Marxism Today and New Labour based their politics on a sociological appraisal of
current conditions and treated these sociological conditions as setting the parameters
of political possibility (Finlayson 2003, 119–124).
The sociological category of the ‘modern’ underpinned both New Times and the
emerging philosophy of the Third Way and New Labour (Morrison 2004, 171). In
an article for Marxism Today in 1991, Blair echoed the language of New Times. He
wrote, ‘‘The notion of a modern view of society as the driving force behind the
freedom of the individual is in truth the implicit governing philosophy of today’s
Labour Party’’ (Blair 1991, 34).
4 Blair’s 1998 Fabian Society pamphlet, The Third
Way, explored the conditions for ‘modernising’ left-of-centre politics in terms that
4 He was, at that time, shadow employment spokesperson.
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argued, must be ‘‘ﬂexible, innovative and forward-looking’’ (Blair 1998: 1; see also
Finlayson 2000, 185). Blair echoed Marxism Today’s criticisms of the traditional
left as being rooted in a Fordist paradigm, arguing that social democracy was
‘‘inﬂexible…[and] too inefﬁcient and low quality in its provision of public services’’
(Blair 1998, 5). The Thatcher government had engaged in ‘‘necessary acts of
modernisation’’ (Blair 1998, 5). Blair’s analysis was shot through with post-Fordist
themes such as ‘‘Technological advance and the rise of skills and information as key
drivers of employment and new industries’’ (Blair 1998, 6). Crucially, Blair
followed Marxism Today in presenting post-Fordist trends as potentially liberating,
connecting the new economy with a new culture of individualism and a new politics
of individual responsibility: ‘‘A dynamic knowledge-based economy founded on
individual empowerment and opportunity, where governments enable, not com-
mand’’ (Blair 1998, 7).
However, it is overly facile to regard New Times as a blueprint for New Labour.
The Gramscian strategies advocated by Hall did not entail an accommodation with
post-Fordist conditions, but, rather, a much more active attempt to construct a new
culturalpolitics withinthese.Inaﬁnal 1998special issueofMarxismToday,Hall and
other Gramscians took New Labour to task for simply accommodating themselves to
Thatcherite individualism rather than creatively constructing new social alliances to
support a genuinely left agenda (Finalyson 2003, 121; Gilbert 2000, 223–224; Hall
1998). But Finlayson points out that alongside the Gramscian tendency, the New
Times project also incorporated a technological and economic determinist outlook
which tended to present post-Fordist conditions as themselves generating or even
necessitating a particular political response (Finalyson 2003, 123).
The greatest inﬂuence of Marxism Today on New Labour derived from the
magazine’s technological futurist orientation (Finlayson 2003, 123). The key
representative of this outlook was Leadbeater, the ‘‘[l]eading Marxist enthusiast of
the knowledge economy’’ (Finlayson 2003, 121). Leadbeater articulated a
‘‘vanguardist futurism’’ that characterized what Finlayson calls the ‘‘Demos
tendency’’ within Marxism Today (Finlayson 2003, 124). The cleavage between
the Demos tendency and the Gramscians such as Hall was clear in the 1998 special
issue on the meaning of New Labour. Hall condemned New Labour for failing to
achieve a creative counter-hegemonic project, while Mulgan (by then an advisor in
10 Downing Street) excoriated critics such as Hall and Eric Hobsbawm for refusing
to recognize the practical responsibilities of government (Hall 1998; Mulgan 1998).
Demos: Lean Democracy and Knowledge Capitalism
The techno-futurist tendency of Marxism Today continued within Demos in the
1990s. Leadbeater, who became an associate of Demos and authored numerous
Demos reports, was particularly important in developing and linking two strands
earlier articulated in the context of ‘New Times’: post-Fordism and democratiza-
tion. As he put it in Living on Thin Air, ‘‘The goal of becoming a knowledge-driven
society… is radical and emancipatory’’ (Leadbeater 1999, 16).
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zation in techno-futurist terms. Enthusiasm for technology as a basis for
democratization was a prominent theme in a 1994 issue of Demos Quarterly, with
articles on ‘‘electrifying democracy’’ including optimistic visions of the promise of
cable TV for decentralized ‘‘electronic town meetings’’ and ‘‘tele-voting’’ (Adonis
and Mulgan 1994, 3; Becker 1994; Bartle 1994). New communications technology
promised a move beyond mass media that would facilitate the shift from mass party
politics to more decentralized forms of participation (Adonis and Mulgan 1994, 17).
In an article titled ‘‘Lean Democracy and the Leadership Vacuum,’’ Leadbeater
and Mulgan advocated ‘‘a shift towards direct democracy, offering citizens a
multiplicity of channels to inﬂuence political decision making’’ (Leadbeater and
Mulgan 1994, 47). Terming this program ‘‘lean democracy,’’ they drew an explicit
parallel with post-Fordist forms of ‘‘lean organization’’ in the private sector. Lean
organizations are characterized by ‘‘ﬂexibility and team work.’’ They draw upon
high skills, ‘‘waste little time, energy, skills and materials. They move fast and
innovate’’ (Leadbeater and Mulgan 1994, 50). All this contrasted with the existing
political system: politicians ‘‘are at best semiskilled’’ and ‘‘the output of the political
system is often of low quality’’ (Leadbeater and Mulgan 1994, 52).’’[L]ean
factories’’ operate according to ‘‘just in time production schedules’’ whereas ‘‘the
political system works to a just-get-by schedule’’ (Leadbeater and Mulgan 1994,
51–52). The rapid feedback between consumer preference and production facilitated
by post-Fordist ﬂexible production methods and information technologies provided
a model for a more direct relationship between citizen preference and policy,
bypassing the need for representation. Leadbeater and Mulgan wrote:
Manufacturers and retailers operating just-in-time production systems have
developed hugely sophisticated computer systems to track consumer prefer-
ences in real time and translate them into production. The political system
captures preferences occasionally; the private sector has learned to track them
constantly (Leadbeater and Mulgan 1994, 53).
As in just-in-time production, new technologies would make possible new kinds
of reﬂexivity. Recalling Robin Murray’s Marxism Today analysis of ‘‘Benetton
Britain,’’ Leadbeater and Mulgan wrote: ‘‘Retailers have the technology to record
thousands of real time changes in people’s preferences’’ and they asserted, ‘‘There is
no reason why this technology should not be applied to politics: a just-in-time
democracy. The democratic possibilities of combining the television, personal
computer and information superhighway have hardly been explored’’ (Leadbeater
and Mulgan 1994, 61).
New technology would provide the means for democratization. But there was
also the deterministic argument that new technologies themselves required this
democratic shift. So Leadbeater and Mulgan noted the incongruity of new
technologies with old fashioned mass party politics (Leadbeater and Mulgan 1994,
67). Politics needed to engage in a more complete way ‘‘with a culture that is
increasingly electronic, based on computers, video and compact discs, where text,
image and sound combine’’ (Leadbeater and Mulgan 1994, 67). In a subsequent
issue of Demos Quarterly on ‘‘Liberation Technology?’’ focusing on the coming
Participation as Post-Fordist Politics 397
123‘‘information superhighway,’’ Mulgan emphasized interactivity as a feature of
contemporary technology and culture: ‘‘Modern generations expect to be able to
respond… [They] doubt any format that is simply monologue’’ (Mulgan 1994, 3).
Direct democratization was therefore mandated by the pace of technological
change. This was a politics of ‘future shock.’
Leabeater and Mulgan’s discourse of direct democracy mobilized a distinctly
managerial language: the need to ‘‘learn from the best practices in the corporate
sector,’’ the politician as a ‘‘[s]ervice provider’’, the evaluation of ‘‘performance,’’ a
‘‘just-in-time democracy’’ (Leadbeater and Mulgan 1994, 57, 63, 61; see also
Gilbert 2000; Dillow 2007). They couched the need for democratization in terms of
the necessity of keeping up to date and maintaining efﬁcient performance and
delivery. Citizens were cast as customers. For example, Leadbeater and Mulgan
complained that ‘‘Many layers of political and civil service bureaucracy separate the
customers (citizens) from the producers (powerholders)’’ (Leadbeater and Mulgan
1994: 51). In line with this managerial framework, they asserted the end of
ideology. Instead of the zero-sum conﬂict of left and right, there could be a
‘‘positive sum politics’’ (Allen 1994). Mulgan argued that Demos’s proposals were
geared toward ‘‘life after politics’’ (Mulgan 1997a, b, xviii–xix; see also Leadbeater
1999: 16). If the political task was adaptation to the knowledge economy, then
ideology was indeed no longer relevant. The politician was just a manager of
societal change.
Governing Through Culture
Demos inherited from Marxism Today a conviction as to the political importance of
culture. Whether writing about new technologies, economic enterprise, employment,
or the functions of government, the emphasis for Demos was on cultural values and
practices. As Mulgan put it, ‘‘The starting point is culture’’ (Mulgan 1994: 3).
However, this was a very different kind of cultural politics from the Gramscian style
advocatedby Hall.Demos’sapproach toculturewastightly boundupwith itstechno-
futurism: technological and economic modernization was carrying with it a tendency
toward cultural modernization. Mapping onto the knowledge economy was a new
culture of openness, pluralism, individual self-expression, and democratic assertive-
ness. It was these values that Demos thinkers such as Mulgan, Leadbeater, Perri 6,
Tom Bentley, and others saw coming to the fore in Britain in the run-up to the 1997
election, and which they celebrated as representing a ‘‘British Spring.’’ ‘‘The
generations, brought up against the background of empire and traditional values,’’
theyargued,‘‘areslowlygivingwaytoagenerationbroughtupwithglobalisationand
information technologies, greater equality between men and women, and ecological
awareness’’ (Mulgan et al. 1997, 1). For these Demos thinkers, the British public
increasingly showed attachment to post-Fordist and ‘‘post-material’’ values of
individual choice and personal freedom (Mulgan et al. 1997, 16). Demos celebrated
these features of the post-Fordist public as a break from the closed, hierarchical, and
class-bound cultures of Britain’s past. The linking of the new economy with cultural
transformationisexempliﬁedbyLeadbeater’scaseformakingBritainthe‘‘California
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and creative culture, for which California in the 1990s seemed the ideal model
(Leadbeater 1997b).
Demos thinkers presented cultural change both as something that followed from
technological and economic developments and as something that had to be managed
and actively shaped for the sake of promoting these developments. Culture was
therefore a proper target for policy. Perri 6, Demos’s research director, made the case
for ‘‘Governing by Cultures.’’ In contrast to the narrow ‘‘economistic view of
government’s powers’’ that dominated in the twentieth century, he argued that
governmentcouldexertinﬂuence byenablingthe culturalshiftsthatinturnsupported
economic change: ‘‘Creating and sustaining the cultural resources necessary to make
privatelybasedeconomicdynamismandsocialviabilitypossibleisthecentraltaskfor
society.’’Thestateshouldactasa‘‘culturecatalyst,’’workingtobuild‘‘socialcapital’’
and thereby enabling ‘‘a viable capitalist social order’’ (6 1995,2 ,4 ,5 ,8 ) .
6 dwelt on the need for government to help foster a ‘‘high trust’’ culture. Britain’s
economic performance was hindered by the fact that it was ‘‘still a low-trust
society’’ (6 1995, 5, 6). A key Third Way concern in the 1990s was the growing
disconnect between politics and the public, witnessed by low election turnout,
apathy, and distrust. For Demos this indicated the gap that had opened up between
late modern culture and overly rigid old-fashioned institutions (Mulgan 1997a, b,x ,
xvii). In their case for ‘lean democracy,’ Leadbeater and Mulgan suggested that
direct democratization would lead to a restoration of public trust in government. The
editorial to the ‘lean democracy’ issue of Demos Quarterly asserted that by making
politics ‘‘more transparent and responsive, more effective and more accountable’’
lean democracy would ‘‘restore public conﬁdence that politicians are ﬁt to lead
society’’ (Demos 1994, vii).
The concern with culture and trust also followed from Demos’s advocacy of
decentralization. The notion of the ‘network’ was crucial to Demos thinking about
governance, as the thinktank argued for the decentralization of public action, from
Whitehall to networks of voluntary organizations and civic or social entrepreneurs
(Leadbeater 1997a; Leadbeater and Goss 1998). Drawing on current sociological
analysis, Leadbeater emphasized the underpinnings of the new economy in network
forms such as university-industry links and innovation hubs (Leadbeater 1999, 111,
127–133, 141; see also Bevir 2005: 45, 51). Informal culture and practices seemed
to be more signiﬁcant than formal rules for maintaining such decentralized, network
forms of organization. For Leadbeater, trust was the essential ‘‘lubricant’’ for the
knowledge economy (Leadbeater 1999, 150). Crucially, Leadbeater recognized
broad public trust in technoscientiﬁc institutions as a social condition for successful
innovation. The key example was Monsanto’s failure to generate public trust in GM
foods. Companies like Monsanto relied on public trust which provided ‘‘their
license to operate and innovate’’ (Leadbeater 1999, 153).
The idea of a crisis of trust, which has become so central to government concern
with ‘science and society,’ was articulated in more general terms by Leadbeater as
an aspect of the transition to ‘‘knowledge capitalism’’ (Leadbeater 1999, 9).
Leadbeater suggested that a ‘‘wave’’ of social and institutional innovation needed to
take place in order to make good ‘‘our trust deﬁcit’’ (Leadbeater 1999, 150).
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forms of solidarity, but saw the positive side of this in creating the free agents who
could form networks and engage in innovation. He rejected the communitarian view
that trust was rooted in shared values: we should promote ‘‘modern rather than
traditional, open rather than closed, forms of trust’’ (Leadbeater 1999, 167).
The network of free agents, bound together by bonds of trust rather than
hierarchical organization, was Demos’s template for reconceptualizing institutions.
Leadbeater’s prescriptions for the welfare state, for example, involved breaking
down the traditional public sector and its large organizations and mass provision and
instead developing public–private partnerships linking the state with businesses and
voluntary organizations and encouraging ‘civic’ or social entrepreneurship. These
ideas drew support from the American political scientist Mark Moore’s notion of
‘‘public value.’’ Moore’s book, which was taken up by Mulgan while head of the
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, was a manifesto for transforming public manage-
ment away from centralized bureaucratic structures toward more ﬂexible,
decentralized and responsive relationships between ‘‘coproduce[rs]’’ (Moore
1995, 117–118; Wilsdon et al. 2005, 28; cf. Newman 2007, 41). In Moore’s view,
public sector management should be about ﬁnding ‘‘ways to engage loose networks
of professions, interest groups, political associations, and the media in efforts to
coproduce the managers’ goals’’ (Moore 1995, 118). Moore drew on the example of
post-Fordist modes of management (e.g. ‘‘getting close to the customer’’) in the
private sector and he contrasted his program with the older top-down model of
‘‘scientiﬁc management’’ (Moore 1995, 288). Leadbeater invoked the notion of
public value in Living on Thin Air as he argued for the reorganization of the public
sector: ‘‘We need a welfare state that is increasingly focused on investment in social
capital, to create public value and to develop people’s capabilities to look after
themselves’’ (Leadbeater 1999, 230). Leadbeater has subsequently developed the
idea that the users of public services should no longer be passive recipients but,
rather, actively involved in ‘‘co-production,’’ i.e. ‘‘shaping the service they receive’’
(Leadbeater 2004, 59; see also Needham 2007). This argument also extended
Leadbeater’s Marxism Today case for a personal politics centering on individual
responsibility (see also Leadbeater et al. 2008).
Demos’sadvocacyofparticipationinthe1990swaslinkedtoitscaseforreshaping
the social and cultural order for the knowledge economy. This meant a new
institutional ﬂuidity, including the devolution of governmental power into the social
via networks of public and private institutions, voluntary associations, etc. It also
meantthepromotionofnewformsofsubjectivity,instillingandrequiringtheexercise
of agency by citizen-consumers. Participation would help to promote this new social
identity of the citizen-consumer and would foster the social and cultural conditions
(especially trust) for the new decentralized practices of governance and innovation.
Giddens: Democratization, Globalization and Reﬂexivity
These kinds of arguments were reinforced by the sociological theory of Giddens. He
shared with Demos such fundamental tenets as the idea that globalization was
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responsibility and that new post-materialist values were taking precedence over older
class politics, so that the classic left–right split was losing its salience. This context
called for greater responsiveness of government to citizens. In The Third Way,
therefore, Giddens advocated ‘‘democratizing democracy’’ (Giddens 1998, 70):
The downward pressure of globalization introduces not only the possibility but
the necessity of forms of democracy other than the orthodox voting process.
Government can re-establish more direct contact with citizens, and citizens
with government, through ‘‘experiments with democracy’’—local direct
democracy, electronic referenda, citizens’ juries (Giddens 1998, 75; see also
Thorpe and Gregory 2010, 283).
He suggested that forms of direct democracy could be an ‘‘enduring comple-
ment’’ to voting and representative government (Giddens 1998, 75).
Giddens presented such institutional reforms as necessary adaptations to
sweeping social changes: globalization, but also intensifying individualism,
accompanied by what Giddens called ‘life politics’ concerned with issues such as
identity, the environment, health, sexuality, leisure, etc. (Giddens 1991; Driver and
Martell 2002, 83). Life politics was an instantiation of a new reﬂexivity (i.e.
knowledgeable self-monitoring) across all areas of social life, reﬂecting the decline
of convention and traditional authority, and the necessity of making choices amid a
proliferation of information and expertise (Giddens 1990, 109; 1991; 1994a;
Finlayson 2003, 129). This critical knowledgeability of social life owed a great deal
to science, but science was itself becoming subject to democratic reﬂexivity:
‘‘science and technology cannot stay outside democratic processes. Experts cannot
be relied upon automatically to know what is good for us… they should be called
upon to justify their conclusions in the face of public scrutiny’’ (Giddens 1998, 59).
Giddens argued that globalization gave rise to a more reﬂexive individual
consciousness and a more skeptical public, demanding new modes of accountability
and governance (Giddens 1990, 156–158). Finlayson points out that this analysis
shared with the techno-futurist orientation within Marxism Today, and especially
with Demos, the sense that ‘‘there is no point waging any resistance’’ against the
objective reality of globalization (Finlayson 2003, 129). Indeed, argues Finlayson,
‘‘the more technological and futurist side of New Times, that which predominates in
a think-tank like Demos, can ﬁnd in Giddens’ theory the ethical and ontological
basis it lacks’’ (Finlayson 2003, 130). Giddens’ sociology provided a framework for
justifying policies as being mandated by objective societal conditions, especially as
ways of reconciling social and political order with social change. For Giddens,
sociological understanding enables political action as ‘‘the practical governance of
social change’’ (Giddens in Cassell ed. 1993, 146–148). And Giddens has suggested
that he shared with Blair this recognition of the need for politics to respond to social
change: ‘‘One of the reasons I quite like being reasonably close to Tony Blair is he
does, to me, take seriously that the world has changed in fundamental ways over the
past 20 or 30 years’’ (Giddens, quoted in Mann 1999). In the Foreword to a book
evaluating 10 years of New Labour, Giddens suggests that, at least in broad terms,
his analysis was taken on board: ‘‘I am not suggesting that Labour’s leaders would
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believe they accepted the need to respond to these… sets of inﬂuences, and that this
acceptance helps one understand much about the New Labour project’’ (Giddens
2008: xiii).
New Labour and the Politics of Participation
The view that political transformation was mandated by social change informed
Blair’s advocacy of new forms of democratic involvement, which he presented as
updating citizenship in line with the new culture of consumerist individualism. In his
1991 Marxism Today article, Blair advanced democratization as a way of channeling
individualism into public action, rather than individual agency just being expressed
via the market (Blair 1991, 33). The notion of a renewal of democracy was prominent
also in Blair’s 1998 Fabian Society pamphlet. Blair devoted a section to ‘‘Active
Government: Partnership and Decentralisation,’’ in which he argued enthusiastically
for ‘‘experiments’’ with democracy, including citizen juries: ‘‘The democratic
impulse needs to be strengthened by ﬁnding new ways to enable citizens to share in
decision-making that affects them. For too long a false antithesis has been claimed
between ‘representative’ and ‘direct’ democracy’’ (Blair 1998, 15).
Blair’s justiﬁcations for political change bore a striking resemblance to Marxism
Today’s analysis of New Times. There was the same sociologism—a view of
politics as adaptation to social and economic transformation. Blair described the
Third Way approach as ‘‘‘permanent revisionism’… based on a clear view of the
changes taking place in advanced industrial societies’’ (Blair 1998, 4). He argued
that old left politics ‘‘was an expression of old industry’’ and that the welfare state
reﬂected Keynesian-Fordist relations of ‘‘secure jobs’’ and ‘‘relatively closed
national economies.’’ Those structures were not well suited to a ‘‘world of growing
competition, external shocks and industrial and technological change’’ (Blair 1998,
5, 8).
The argument was for the transformation of the state along post-Fordist lines.
Government would need to ‘‘learn new skills… acting ﬂexibly to anticipate
problems and solve them’’ (Blair 1998, 7). Similarly to Leadbeater and Mulgan’s
notion of ‘lean democracy,’ Blair applied the terms of post-Fordism—ﬂexibility,
skills, and responsiveness—to the activities of politics and the structures of
government.
Since the 1990s, ‘democratization’ has been presented by New Labour as a
deﬁning feature of their political program. For example, the election manifesto of
1997 promised a new approach of open and decentralized decision-making. Since
then, the New Labour government has indeed implemented participatory initiatives
in local government and social policy areas such as urban redevelopment, hospital
governance, and public services (Pratchett 1999; Gustafsson and Driver 2005;
Marinetto 2003; Dinham 2005; Chandler 2001; Rowe and Shepherd 2002; Thorpe
and Gregory 2010). The July 1998 White Paper Modern Local Government: In
Touch with the People (DETR 1998) set out proposals aimed at encouraging local
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referenda (Rao 2000, 134–145).
However, revealingly, these reforms in local government were framed in terms of
the managerial post-Fordist language of efﬁcient delivery, responsiveness, ﬂexibil-
ity, joined-up government, best practice, and streamlining (Rao 2000, 127–130,
178–179). Social policy researcher Mike Marinetto has argued that New Labour has
characterized the relationship between local government and citizens in ‘‘quasi-
consumerist terms.’’ Local authorities were required to draw up Best Value
Performance Plans and distribute these to the public, who could respond via
questionnaire surveys or ‘‘focus-group style public consultations’’ (Marinetto 2003,
116). In this way, participation has been bound up with the reconﬁguration of public
services in terms of consumerist values.
Participation exercises under New Labour were connected to the value of
‘choice’ in public services and recipients of services were recast as active ‘citizen-
consumers’ (Clarke et al. 2007; Clarke 2005, 2007; Newman and Clarke 2009, 150).
In 2004, Blair argued that in the future ‘‘service will be driven not by the
government or by the manager but by the user’’ (Blair, quoted in Newman and
Clarke 2009, 160). The participation agenda is thereby linked to an ideal of the
active citizen as both consumer and co-producer. Participation unleashes this
reﬂexive activity, but in order to do so it must create or foster these kinds of active
subjects (see also Thorpe and Gregory 2010; Finlayson 2003, 194).
New Labour’s implementation of participation is therefore linked to a vision of a
new social order and new social subjects. In his 1987 Fabian pamphlet, Leadbeater
argued that to develop a credible political strategy, the Labour party ‘‘must be
strategic in a forward-looking sense. There must be some vision of what kind of
society this strategy would create’’ (Leadbeater 1987, 3). Talk of reshaping culture
and society has become pervasive in UK science policy, in which promoting the
knowledge economy is presented as requiring cultural change, particularly within
universities. In his foreword to Our Competitive Future, Blair wrote that ‘‘In
Government, in business, in our universities and throughout society we must do
much more to foster a new entrepreneurial spirit’’ (DTI 1998a, 5). The creation of a
‘new spirit’ as the task of government is an idea that has a strong afﬁnity with Perri
6’s notion that governments need to have ‘‘missions to inﬂuence cultures’’ and with
the broader Demos idea of cultural change as a necessary accompaniment of
economic change (6 et al. 1995, 1).
There is a tension in New Labour ideology between presenting policy as
responding to objective social change and presenting policy as itself actively
transforming society. But the two approaches are reconciled in the following way:
the activity of shaping subjectivities, or governing through culture, is geared
primarily toward fostering the social attributes regarded as necessary in order to
successfully adapt to the objective conditions—the rise of consumerism and the
knowledge economy. The task of shaping culture is to ensure the cultural and social
underpinnings of the knowledge economy: an entrepreneurial spirit in institutions,
and a consumerist orientation in public life.
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and Technology
Initiatives toward public engagement with science and technology should be
understood as an aspect of this broader Third Way movement toward ‘democratiza-
tion’asastrategyofgovernanceof,andthrough,culture.Thisbroaderimpetustoward
‘participation’ and ‘involvement’ in British political rhetoric provides the discursive
and ideological context in which speciﬁc argumentsforpublic engagement inscience
have gained traction. In particular, public engagement gains its policy rationale from
the idea that it is a ‘new politics’ appropriate to the ‘new economy.’
The notion that Britain needs to mobilize its science base for commercial success
and competitiveness in the global market is the central idea in British science
policy. The primary purpose of science policy, in this view, is to develop an
‘‘innovative knowledge economy that will enable us to compete against low-wage
countries like India and China’’ (Sainsbury 2007, 4). Public engagement in science
policy derives political legitimacy from being embedded in these discourses of post-
Fordism and the knowledge economy (Thorpe and Gregory 2010).
The idea that innovation takes place in the context of a web of both competitive
and cooperative relationships is expressed in the notion of the ‘‘innovation
ecosystem’’ in Lord Sainsbury’s The Race to the Top (2007: 23; DIUS 2008a, 11).
Ensuring a benign ‘‘ecosystem’’ for commercializable technological innovation
means shaping not only institutions, but also public attitudes and emotions. The
Sciencewise (c. 2008) statement of ‘‘The Government’s Approach to Public
Dialogue on Science and Technology’’ deﬁnes the function of public engagement as
follows: ‘‘Our objective is to build conﬁdence in decision-making related to the
undertaking, development and overall governance of science and technology; to
build on the public’s generally positive views of science’’ (Sciencewise 2008.
Emphases added). The language of ‘conﬁdence’ as it appears in science policy
instantiates New Labour’s governance through culture, since it involves the
conceptualization of governance as involving the active shaping of social
consciousness (see also Irwin and Michael 2003, 52–53; Thorpe and Gregory
2010). The 2004 DTI Five-Year program argued: ‘‘Our vision for Britain’s
knowledge economy means a society that is more conﬁdent about the development,
governance, regulation and use of science and technology’’ (DTI 2004, 15). This
went together with goals of employability for life replacing a job for life, and of
fostering an ‘‘enterprise’’ culture: ‘‘Young people need to be excited about the
possibilities of running their own businesses’’ (DTI 2004, 21). Such phrases suggest
that economic strategy requires the governance of culture, constructing affective
conditions such as conﬁdence and excitement. These are subjective attributes of a
population that does not resist, but instead embraces insecurity and change as
desirable aspects of late modernity.
This kind of enthusiasm for change would seem to characterize the ideal
consumer that the DTI referred to in its earlier pivotal White Paper on the
knowledge-driven economy: ‘‘Businesses which produce such [new] products will
only develop where they can gain access to leading–edge customers’’ (DTI 1998b,
8). Lord Sainsbury notes that consumers are increasingly active in the ‘‘co-creation’’
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ﬂexible consumers is suggested also in the recent DIUS (2008b) consultation
document A Vision for Science and Society: ‘‘Those who have the conﬁdence to use
devices and engage with new developments are able to drive consumer innovation’’
(DIUS 2008b, 7). Analysis of what drives innovation is then translated into
prescription; the DIUS asserts, ‘‘We believe everyone should be a conﬁdent
consumer of science and technology’’ (DIUS 2008b, 27).
The Vision document presents change itself as an imperative: as the ‘‘pace of
scientiﬁc development accelerates, so too does the pace of change in our society…
We want to ensure … that nobody gets left behind’’ (DIUS 2008b, 7). Not only
individuals, but also institutions must be adaptable. Theories of the knowledge
economy and Third Way theories of governance assert the need to remake
institutions and break down organizational boundaries, unmaking large modernist
bureaucracies and instead constructing ﬂuid networks, for example via public–
private partnerships. There is, however, in the DIUS document, recognition that this
very blurring of institutional boundaries itself gives rise to problems of distrust:
‘‘Given the close links which exist between business, government and scientists
there is an increased risk of a lack of perceived independence in science.’’ So the
government’s task in relation to these new networks is to remake the social
conditions for legitimacy: to improve ‘‘public reassurance’’ and ‘‘work to improve
public perception’’ (DIUS 2008b, 30; see also Thorpe and Gregory 2010, 287).
The university is presented as having a role not only in producing new
technologies, but also in helping to foster cultural adaptation to that technological
change.Thisisthevalueofparticipationandengagementasanacademicactivity.The
drive toward public engagementmeans thatit isnecessary‘‘toshiftthe organisational
culture in Universities’’ so that ‘‘engaging with the public [becomes] a key part of
what it is to be an academic’’ (DIUS 2008b, 19, 21). The transformed academic will
then assist with the remaking of public subjectivities: ‘‘professionalising public
engagement’’willhelp toward‘‘increasingexcitementinscience’’(DIUS2008b,20).
The consultation document asserts: ‘‘There is no reason why the way science is
conducted, governed or communicated by the private sector should be or be
perceived to be any different from the public sector’’ (DIUS 2008b, 30). What is
surprising in the sentence is the notion that science may be not only produced but
also governed by the private sector. This departs from traditional notions of the
difference between public and private. But it ﬁts with New Labour’s conception of
governance as a process operating through networks across blurred and unstable
boundaries. What holds this complex together is not structure or rules, but more
diffuse conditions of culture and affect. Therein lies the signiﬁcance of public
engagement for the knowledge economy, as a technique for governing culture,
managing affect, and producing subjectivities.
Conclusion: STS, Demos, and Post-Fordist Politics
There has been growing disquiet within STS about the limitations of the UK
government and science elite’s commitment to genuine democratic participation
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123(Irwin and Michael 2003, 55; Wynne 2006; Irwin 2006; Lezaun and Soneryd 2007;
Stirling 2008; Thorpe and Gregory 2010). Brian Wynne, an inﬂuential advocate of
public engagement, has decried the policy construction of participation as a tool for
enhancing public trust in science and technology. He likens the adoption of
participatory language in government policy to ‘‘hitting the notes but missing the
music’’ (Wynne 2006). My analysis suggests, however, that British science policy is
in tune with the Third Way as a politics celebratory of post-Fordism and the
knowledge economy. This gave rise to the conceptualization of participation as a
political form suited to post-Fordist conditions, facilitating the emergence of active
citizen-consumers amenable to the products and services of a knowledge economy.
The science policy view that public participation fosters ‘conﬁdent consumers’
derives its meaning from this broader context of Third Way thought.
Demos has been an important source of advocacy for participatory ideas in
British science policy and has established close links with the academic ﬁeld of
STS. Nonetheless, recent Demos thinking about science and technology is highly
continuous with the thinktank’s more longstanding framework set out earlier in this
paper. A case in point is Demos’s report on The Public Value of Science (2005). The
report has Wynne as a coauthor and draws extensively on research from STS and on
anti-technocratic arguments for participation. But it derives its title concept from the
mid-1990s work of Moore that inﬂuenced Leadbeater and Mulgan (Wilsdon et al.
2005, 27–28). Here, the concept of public value provides the basis for attaching a
broader socially progressive agenda to the knowledge economy. Rather than seeing
the democratization of science as an obstacle to tapping the economic value of
science, democratization and participation should be seen as adding value (Wilsdon
et al. 2005, 59–60). This broader public value is not at odds with, but complements,
and even facilitates, the pursuit of economic value.
The Demos authors speciﬁcally reject an outright opposition to the commercial-
ization of science: ‘‘Collaboration between universities and businesses can be very
positive, and there are strong economic arguments why the UK needs a lot more of
it.’’ They assert that ‘‘The question is not if we strengthen such links but how’’
(Wilsdon et al. 2005, 55. Emphases in original). The shift of the question from ‘if’
to ‘how’ renders a political problem into a problem of management or implemen-
tation. This way of approaching politics has been characteristic of both Demos and
New Labour and is linked to the idea that we are in an age ‘‘after politics’’ in which
polarities of left and right have been transcended (Mulgan ed., 1997b; Gilbert 2000,
229).
The notion that ideological oppositions have been suspended conditions the
approach to democratization. If political questions are transformed into ones of
implementation, then democratization can be seen not as unleashing conﬂict but as a
kind of collaborative brainstorming. Democratization is understood as enabling a
‘positive-sum politics’ (Allen 1994), one that adds perspectives and adds value. In
this way, democracy and participation can be seen as promoting innovation.
Demos’s output continues to be characterized by an optimistic view of the liberating
potential of technology, and by the suggestion that innovation is fostered by
horizontal participatory relationships and hindered by hierarchy. Leadbeater, who
has continued to collaborate with Demos (for example, Leadbeater and Wilsdon
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post-Fordism within Marxism Today, the ‘new economy’ concepts of the late 1990s
period of dot-com exuberance, and today’s notions of Web 2.0, open innovation, or
mass innovation (Leadbeater 2008). In Leadbeater’s work spanning these concepts,
one can see a consistent portrait of the shift away from Fordist mass production and
bureaucratic organization toward ﬂexible production entailing a wide range of
liberatory social and political outcomes: the development of a new kind of
individualism, cultural pluralism and diversity, and new modes of non-hierarchical,
collaborative production. Leadbeater’s analysis of post-Fordism and the knowledge
economy emphasizes the ﬂexibility of new technologies and of the social forms that
accompany them, and presents a picture of the decentralized and pluralistic
character of contemporary innovation processes.
James Wilsdon and Rebecca Willis’s 2004 Demos report on See-Through
Science draws on Leadbeater’s notion of ‘‘open innovation’’ as an argument for
deepening public engagement (Wilsdon and Willis 2004, 50). Engagement, they
argue, means involving the public in the innovation process, drawing on diverse
social actors as sources of innovative ideas. As in Web 2.0, products are
increasingly given content and value by users; hence, public engagement can
become part of this process of diffuse, decentralized innovation. Where the talk of
engagement as a way to produce conﬁdence was a ‘‘defensive’’ way of linking
‘‘innovation and public engagement,’’ open innovation suggests a more active and
positive connection between these agendas (Wilsdon and Willis 2004, 49).
In their 2007 report on the rise of Asian knowledge economies, Leadbeater and
Wilsdon suggest that ‘‘mass innovation’’ is vital if Britain is to compete in a context
of the globalization of science (Leadbeater and Wilsdon 2007, 50). They write:
Britain needs an approach to innovation that is not just about the scientiﬁc
elite, the trendy creative class or entrepreneurial superheroes but which
recognises the contribution that everyone can make as consumers, citizens and
creators. And this message must be cast in terms of cosmopolitan innovation:
Britain as a place that is open to the world’s best ideas, and which will support
anyone from anywhere to put those ideas into practice (Leadbeater and
Wilsdon 2007, 51).
Similarly to the Marxism Today analysis of the cultural pluralism fostered by
post-Fordism and the 1997 Demos report on The British Spring, notions of
democracy and cosmopolitanism are brought into association with the knowledge
economy.
It was in the context of an intellectual alchemy between democracy and
innovation that ingredients of STS scholarship and argument entered into British
science policy discourse. Yet, the resulting mixture is not entirely consistent.
Advocacy of participatory democracy, assuming the openness of technological
choices, sits uneasily with Demos’s longstanding framework of deterministic
techno-futurism. The framework is deterministic in treating the emerging conditions
of post-Fordism, the knowledge economy, and globalization as brute realities to be
accepted and adapted to, rather than resisted. Similarly, New Labour has
emphasized that constant innovation is an imperative of competition in the global
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123economy. This is to locate science, as Dominique Pestre has put it, ‘‘outside the
dialogic order’’ (Pestre 2008, 103. Emphasis in original). If it is necessary to keep up
to date and not fall behind, then the course is already set and there would seem to be
scant choice and little therefore about which to deliberate. These tensions are
inherent in the Third Way framing of participation as a form of political
involvement adapted to, and supportive of, a post-Fordist economy and society.
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